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ABSTRACT. The cost-effectiveness of the implicit (procedural) 
knowledge that supports motor expertise enables surprisingly 
efficient performance when a decision and an action must occur in 
close temporal proximity. The authors argue that if novices learn 
the motor component of performance implicitly rather than explic-
itly, then they will also be efficient when they make a decision and 
execute an action in close temporal proximity. Participants (N = 
35) learned a table tennis shot implicitly or explicitly. The authors 
assessed participants’ motor performance and movement kinemat-
ics under conditions that required a concurrent low-complexity 
decision or a concurrent high-complexity decision about where to 
direct each shot. Performance was disrupted only for participants 
who learned explicitly when they made high-complexity decisions 
but not when they made low-complexity decisions. The authors 
conclude that implicit motor learning encourages cognitively effi-
cient motor control more than does explicit motor learning, which 
allows performance to remain stable when time constraints call for 
a complex decision in tandem with a motor action.
Keywords: analogy learning, cognitive load, expertise, explicit 
instructions, movement kinematics, procedural knowledge
ppropriate decision making requires the integration of 
perceptual information with knowledge obtained from 
previous experiences and places varying demands on cogni-
tive resources, depending on the complexities of the task 
(e.g., Raab, 2003; Sève, Saury, Theureau, & Durand, 2002) 
and the extent to which performance depends on working 
memory (Jameson, Hinson, & Whitney, 2004).
Expert performers’ ability to process the multiple streams 
of information that they need for effective perception–
action interaction characterizes the highly efficient way in 
which they interface with their specialist environment. If 
the environment is time constrained, then performers must 
make decisions and execute movements in close temporal 
proximity. In tennis, for example, hitting a forehand win-
ner past an opponent while running demands appropriate 
movement selection (e.g., should the shot be hit down the 
line, across the court, deep, short, with underspin, or with 
topspin?) coupled with immediate and effective movement 
execution.
One explanation for experts’ highly efficient decision-
making skills is that the nature of the knowledge structures 
that support their motor performance gradually changes 
over time, with an increasing degree of implicit (uncon-
scious) control and a decreasing level of explicit (conscious) 
control. In contrast to conscious control processes, implicit 
processes are faster and are organized as sophisticated pro-
cedural knowledge that can be applied without conscious 
thought (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Lewicki, Hill, & Czyewska, 
1992; Masters & Maxwell, 2004; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977; Willingham, 1998). Implicit processes are therefore 
independent of working memory, which leaves the expert 
with sufficient resources to perform other tasks, such as 
decision making (for a review of the theoretical architecture 
and function of working memory, see Baddeley, 2003). In 
contrast, explicit processes depend on working memory for 
the retrieval of consciously accessible (declarative) knowl-
edge so that the motor system can control movement online 
(Maxwell, Masters, & Eves, 2003). Because highly explicit 
motor behavior depends on working memory, the demands 
that result from multiple task requirements are likely to 
overload the performer and disrupt performance.
In a test of that theory, Poolton, Masters, and Maxwell 
(2006) argued that disrupted motor performance is less 
likely to occur if the motor component of performance 
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is learned implicitly rather than explicitly, because more 
resources will be available for decision making. Inves-
tigators believe that implicit motor learning techniques 
advance implicit control and have found that those tech-
niques engender resistance to disruption from additional 
cognitive loads (e.g., Maxwell, Masters, Kerr, & Weedon, 
2001), moderate psychological pressure (Hardy, Mullen, 
& Jones, 1996; Masters, 1992), and physiological exertion 
(Poolton, Masters, & Maxwell, 2007). 
Using a table tennis task, Poolton et al. (2006) trained 
participants explicitly (by using step-by-step instructions) 
and implicitly (by providing an analogical instruction; see 
Liao & Masters, 2001) and tested their performance in con-
ditions that required that they make a low-complexity deci-
sion or a high-complexity decision regarding the direction 
in which they hit the ball. Differences between the treat-
ment conditions were evident only when participants had 
to make high-complexity decisions, and their motor perfor-
mance was disrupted in the explicit condition but not in the 
implicit condition. In fact, performance in the implicit con-
dition appeared to improve when participants had to process 
high-complexity decisions, which suggests that processing 
efficiency is greater in implicitly trained participants than in 
explicitly trained participants. The latter group appeared to 
be unable to switch efficiently between the tasks or to pro-
cess the tasks in parallel without disruption to motor output 
(Hazeltine, Ruthruff, & Remington, 2006).
Firm conclusions about the underlying reasons for the 
findings of Poolton et al. (2006) are clouded by the possi-
bility that motor adaptations were ongoing during the low-
complexity and high-complexity decision-making tests. 
Participants had to direct shots to a central target during 
the learning phase but to the left or the right side of the 
table during the decision-making phase. Participants’ dif-
ferential adaptation to the new task demands in the two 
conditions may have occurred during the decision-making 
phase. Implicit (analogy) learners’ better adaptation would 
have hidden the disruptive effect of the high-complexity 
decision.
In the present experiment, we addressed that possible con-
found by interspersing the decision-making tests between 
two transfer tests in which we required participants to hit 
balls alternately to the left and right of center. The transfer 
tests served as a measure of baseline transfer performance 
and allowed us to assess the amount of adaptation in the 
two conditions during the test phase (superior performance 
in the second transfer test would be indicative of learning). 
We also performed kinematic analysis of movements to 
identify some of the movement characteristics associated 
with implicit (analogy) learning and explicit (step-by-step) 
learning and to examine the kinematic effect of producing 
a movement and a decision concurrently. We expected that 
participants in the implicit condition would show stable (or 
improved) motor performance and unperturbed movement 
kinematics when we required them to make concurrent low- 
or high-complexity decisions. In contrast, we expected that 
participants in the explicit condition would show reduced 
motor performance and perturbed movement kinematics as 
a result of those requirements (e.g., increased jerk; Maxwell 
et al., 2003). We also expected implicit (analogy) learners to 
report less explicit (declarative) knowledge of their move-
ments than explicit learners would.
Method
Participants
We randomly assigned 35 undergraduate students (age = 
21.3 ± 2.27 years [M ± SD]) from the University of Hong 
Kong to either an analogy (n = 17) or an explicit (n = 
18) condition. All participants were right-handed and had 
little or no table tennis experience. Participants provided 
informed consent and received $100 HK (approximately 
$13 US) for participation.
Apparatus
Participants performed the experiment on a standard table 
tennis table (Komann KBT-2018). At one end was a table 
tennis ball server (Newgy Robo-pong 2000) that discharged 
40-mm balls at a frequency of 30 balls/min. The server 
directed balls down the center line of the table with backspin, 
and the balls ascended to approximately 20 cm at the table’s 
edge. We placed 100 balls (50 white and 50 yellow) in the 
ball storage hopper and mixed them regularly to ensure that 
they were randomly dispersed. We adapted the ball server 
to prevent identification of the ball’s color before it was 
discharged. All participants used a Donic Waldner 500 table 
tennis bat. A reflective marker attached to the distal edge of 
the bat was tracked by a six-camera Qualisys (Gothenburg, 
Sweden) motion capture system, which allowed us to ana-
lyze bat movement kinematics during task execution.
Below the server, we marked six large squares (50 cm × 
50 cm) on the table in two rows (see Figure 1). Each square 
in the row farthest from the participant housed a concen-
tric target (25 cm × 25 cm). During the learning trials, 
participants aimed to hit the central target. We awarded 
participants 3 points for hitting Zone 2 and 3 points for 
hitting Zone 5. A ball landing in any other zone received 1 
point. In the test phase, participants used the targets on the 
left or right of the table. We awarded them 3 points for hit-
ting Zones 1 or 3 and 3 points for hitting Zones 4 or 6. We 
awarded 1 point for hitting any other zone. We gave balls 
hit to the incorrect side of the table or out of a marked zone 
a score of 0. For example, we awarded 1 point for a ball 
directed (correctly) to the right-hand target that hit Zone 2, 
5, 8, or 9 and 0 points for a ball directed to the right-hand 
target that hit Zone 1, 4, or 7.
Procedure
We informed participants that the task was to develop an 
accurate topspin forehand shot. We told them that their objec-
tive in the task was to return shots, with topspin, toward Zone 
2 (see Figure 1). We explained the ball rotation generated 
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by a topspin forehand and asked participants to hold the bat 
with a Western shake-hands grip (Sneyd, 1994). We provided 
separate instructions in the two treatment conditions. We pre-
sented six step-by-step instructions in the explicit treatment 
condition (see Appendix), whereas in the analogy condition, 
we presented a single analogical instruction: “Move the bat 
as if it is traveling up the side of a mountain” (Poolton et al., 
2006). At no point did we demonstrate a topspin forehand. 
Participants completed 300 trials in fifteen 20-trial blocks, 
over a 1-hr learning period. We emphasized the importance 
of following the instructions before each block of trials. If 
a participant failed to hit shots with topspin within a block 
of trials (as judged by the experimenter), then we again 
explained the appropriate ball rotation. We gave no feedback 
concerning the correctness of a participant’s technique. After 
the learning phase, we administered a declarative knowledge 
protocol. In the protocol, we asked participants to report in 
as much detail as possible any movements, methods, or tech-
niques they remembered using to perform the task.
In the test phase, we interspersed low- and high-complexity 
tests between two transfer tests. Each test consisted of two 
blocks of 20 trials (we later analyzed the two blocks togeth-
er as one 40-trial block). In the two transfer tests, instead of 
hitting toward the central target, participants were to hit the 
balls to targets on the left (Zone 1) or the right (Zone 3) side 
of the table in an alternating sequence (i.e., the first ball to 
the right, the second to the left, the third to the right, and so 
on). In the low- and high-complexity tests, ball color speci-
fied the location of the target. In the low-complexity test, 
participants were to hit white balls to the right and yellow 
balls to the left. Before motor performance, we evaluated 
participants’ ability to make correct decisions in a 20-trial 
block (decision-only test) in which participants verbally 
indicated whether the ball should be hit left or right.
In the high-complexity test, we alternated the ball color 
and target representation after every two balls. For Trials 
1 and 2, as in the low-complexity test, participants had 
to hit white balls to the right and yellow balls to the left. 
In Trials 3 and 4, we switched the ball color and target 
representation so that participants had to hit white balls 
to the left and yellow balls to the right. Trials 5 and 6 
reverted to white–right and yellow–left, Trials 7 and 8 
reverted to white–left and yellow–right, and so on. As in 
the low-complexity test, we evaluated participants’ abil-
FIGURE 1. Target areas. Participants targeted Zone 2 during the learning phase, whereas 
they targeted Zones 1 and 3 during the test phase.
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ity to make correct decisions by using a decision-only 
test. On occasions when a participant forgot the correct 
ball color sequence, he or she notified the experimenter, 
who then asked the participant to resume from the initial 
sequence (e.g., for the first two balls, hit white balls to the 
right-hand target).
We computed the total score in each block of 20 trials 
(maximum score = 60) as a percentage and used that score 
as the dependent variable in the learning phase. In the test 
phase, we examined the manipulation of decision complex-
ity by totaling the number of correct decisions made in the 
low- and the high-complexity tests when the decisions (a) 
were made without a motor response and (b) were accom-
panied by a motor response. To assess motor performance in 
the test phase and to avoid the possibility of confounding by 
a tradeoff of decision versus motor performance, we com-
puted our dependent variable from the mean performance 
only on trials in which participants made a correct decision.
During the high-complexity test, we asked participants to 
immediately report occasions when they forgot the sequence 
of the task. It became clear, however, that participants 
had on occasion unwittingly forgotten the order that they 
had to follow. A string of correct responses would be 
followed by a series of incorrect responses, but the order 
of the incorrect decisions was not random. It seemed that 
participants inadvertently missed a ball in the sequence and 
continued the sequence from the next ball. As a result, the 
ball sequence that participants followed on those occasions 
was not matched to the experimental ball sequence. Thus, 
their performance scores did not always reflect task 
proficiency. To address that problem, we identified the 
ball in the sequence that the participant had missed, and 
we then rescored performance from that point on. Because 
of the subjective nature of that procedure, a second rater 
independently rescored the number of correct decisions 
made in the high-complexity test. Significant correlations 
between the two raters in both the decision-only test and 
the decision-plus-motor-performance test confirmed the 
accuracy of the primary rater’s scoring; intraclass correla-
tion coefficients (ICCs) = .89 and .84, Fs(1, 34) = 16.81 and 
11.14, respectively, both ps < .001.
We used the motion capture system to track bat movement 
in the first and final blocks of learning and in the first 20 
trials of each block in the test phase. The system operated 
at a sampling frequency of 60 Hz and tracked the reflective 
marker attached to the bat to within 1 mm of error. The x, 
y, and z coordinates specified the relative position of the bat 
at each point in time. From the output data, we extracted 
the three-dimensional (3D) coordinates of the bat marker 
trace for each trial. We defined a trial as the initial backward 
preparatory movement through the forward movement to the 
highest vertical point of the follow-through. From the coor-
dinates, we computed peak and mean movement speeds by 
calculating the distance the bat marker traveled in 3D space 
(in meters) at each sampled time point and then dividing that 
distance by unit time (i.e. 1/60 s). We calculated peak and 
root mean square acceleration (RMSacc) and peak and root 
mean square jerk (RMSjerk) as the second and third time 
derivatives of distance, respectively. We also calculated trial-
to-trial variability (SD) for each of the six kinematic mea-
sures, which yielded 12 dependent variables. We excluded 
data from 7 participants (3 analogy condition participants, 
4 explicit condition participants) from kinematic analysis 
of the learning phase because of either system failure or 
poor-quality marker traces that prevented a comprehensive 
analysis. Thus, we included data from 14 analogy condi-
tion participants and 15 explicit condition participants in 
the learning phase analysis. We excluded data from 4 par-
ticipants (1 analogy condition participant, 3 explicit condi-
tion participants) from analysis of the test phase. Thus, we 
included data from 16 analogy condition participants and 15 
explicit condition participants in the test phase analysis.
Two independent raters scored the declarative knowledge 
protocols. The raters assessed the amount of information 
related to the mechanics of movement (e.g., “I turned my 
shoulders as I struck the ball” or “I kept the bat as much 
as possible on a vertical plane”). The .92 ICC value, F(1, 
34) = 22.51, p < .001, showed a high level of concordance 
between the two raters’ scores. We therefore averaged the 
scores from the independent raters for analysis.
Results
Performance: Learning Phase
We assessed the accuracy of topspin forehand perfor-
mance during learning with a 2 × 15 (Group × Block) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on 
block and with Greenhouse–Geisser's epsilon adjustment to 
degrees of freedom in all cases. A main effect was found for 
block, F(8.01, 264.26) = 23.26, p < .001, η2 = .41, but not 
for group, F(1, 33) = 0.66, p = .42, η2 = .02. No Group × 
Block interaction was evident, F(8.01, 264.26) = 0.74, p = 
.65, η2 = .02. As illustrated in Figure 2, the treatment condi-
tions appeared to have similar learning outcomes.
Kinematics: Learning Phase
We found no differential effect of instructional method 
in the analysis of performance during the learning phase. 
We therefore did not expect main effects of group in any 
of the kinematic parameters. Performance increased over 
blocks, however, so we expected to see evidence of change 
over blocks in the kinematic parameters. The same rationale 
caused us to expect no interactions between group and block.
Univariate ANOVAs that we computed for each depen-
dent measure demonstrated significant effects of block for 
mean speed, F(1, 26) = 12.22, p < .005, η2 = .32; peak 
speed, F(1, 26) = 20.46, p < .001, η2 = .44; peak RMSacc, 
F(1, 26) = 5.36, p < .05, η2 = .17; and trial-to-trial vari-
ability of mean RMSacc, F(1, 26) = 6.19, p < .05, η2 = .19. 
Mean and peak speed and peak RMSacc increased over 
learning, whereas trial-to-trial variability decreased. That 
pattern suggests that participants made shots with greater 
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force and became more consistent with practice. Although 
changes were not significant for other variables, they fol-
lowed the same pattern (i.e., increasing mean and peak 
values and decreasing trial-to-trial variability).
Contrary to expectations, group effects were evident for 
peak RMSacc, F(1, 26) = 12.18, p < .005, η2 = .32; mean 
RMSacc, F(1, 26) = 9.77, p < .005, η2 = .27; trial-to-trial 
variability of peak RMSacc, F(1, 26) = 4.44, p < .05, η2 = 
.15; peak RMSjerk, F(1, 26) = 14.80, p < .005, η2 = .36; 
trial-to-trial variability of peak RMSjerk, F(1, 26) = 4.28, 
p < .05, η2 = .14; mean RMSjerk, F(1, 26) = 4.44, p < .05, 
η2 = .15; and trial-to-trial variability of mean RMSjerk, F(1, 
26) = 5.94, p < .05, η2 = .19. In all cases, larger values were 
evident for the analogy group. No interactions between 
group and block were found.
Decision-Only Test
A 2 × 2 (Group × Decision) ANOVA with repeated mea-
sures on number of correct verbal responses that participants 
made in the low- and high-complexity tests showed no main 
effect of group, F(1, 33) = 1.22, p = .28, η2 = .04, and no 
interaction, F(1, 33) = 0.63, p = .43, η2 = .02. A main effect 
of decision was evident, F(1, 33) = 56.65, p < .001, η2 = 
.63. Participants made fewer correct decisions in the high-
complexity test (M = 81.71%) than in the low-complexity 
test (M = 98.86%), corroborating the effectiveness of the 
complexity manipulation.
Motor Performance: Test Phase
We assessed the ability of participants to adapt to hit-
ting the ball to the left and right sides of the table rather 
than down its center by conducting a Group × Block (final 
20 trials of learning vs. Transfer 1) ANOVA. The analysis 
showed a main effect of block only, F(1, 33) = 9.84, p < 
.005, η2 = .23. Performance accuracy in the transfer test 
was lower, but the two conditions appeared to transfer to the 
new task demands in a similar manner. 
We assessed motor performance in the test phase with a 
2 × 4 (Group × Block) ANOVA with repeated measures; we 
used the percentage score per correct decision as the depen-
dent variable. No significant effect of group was found, 
F(1, 33) = 1.49, p = .23, η2 = .04. However, a main effect 
of block, F(2.81, 92.64) = 4.70, p < .01, η2 = .13, and an 
interaction, F(2.81, 92.64) = 4.30, p < .01, η2 = .12, were 
evident. A posteriori analysis of simple main effects showed 
no effect of block for the analogy condition, F(2.59, 41.4) = 
1.39, p = .26, η2 = .08. However, the analysis revealed a 
significant effect for the explicit condition, F(2.72, 46.25) = 
7.22, p < .005, η2 = .30. As shown in Figure 2, partici-
pants in the explicit condition showed significantly poorer 
performance in the high-complexity test than in the low-
complexity test, p < .01, and in the second transfer test, p 
< .005. Moreover, participants in the explicit condition had 
superior motor performance in both the low-complexity test 
and Transfer 2 than in Transfer 1, both ps < .01, which was 
indicative of continued learning during the test phase.
Assessment of the number of correct motor responses 
participants made in the low- and high-complexity tests 
yielded no main effect of group, F(1, 33) = 2.08, p = .16, η2 
= .06, or Group × Block interaction, F(1, 33) = .31, p = .58, 
η2 = .01. However, an effect of block, F(1, 33) = 71.21, p < 
.001, η2 = .68, was evident. Participants made more correct 
decisions in the low-complexity test (M = 94.72%) than in 
the high-complexity test (M = 78.14%).
FIGURE 2. Motor performance (hitting accuracy) in the analogy condition and explicit condition during the learning phase and the 
test phase (T1 = Transfer Test 1; L-C = low-complexity decision test; H-C = high-complexity decision test; T2 = Transfer Test 2).
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Kinematics: Test Phase
The performance results in the test phase allowed us to 
make specific predictions regarding changes in kinematic 
parameters of the movements in each treatment condi-
tion. The absence of performance change in the analogy 
condition suggests that an absence of changes in kinematic 
parameters should also be evident. Conversely, changes 
to key kinematic parameters should reflect the changes in 
performance in the explicit condition, particularly during 
the high-complexity decision test. To verify those predic-
tions, we conducted separate univariate repeated measures 
analyses for each group, taking each of the 12 kinematic 
variables as a dependent measure.
We found no significant effects of block in the analogy 
condition; p > .05 in all cases. That result is consistent with 
participants’ performance data (see Table 1). However, 
significant changes were evident in several of the kine-
matic parameters that we assessed in the explicit condition, 
including mean speed, F(1.84, 25.70) = 5.11, p = .01, η2 = 
.27; peak speed, F(2.67, 37.65) = 8.50, p < .001, η2 = .38; 
trial-to-trial variability of mean speed, F(2.55, 35.76) = 
3.07, p < .05, η2 = .18; trial-to-trial variability of RMSacc, 
F(1.83, 25.59) = 3.64, p = .04, η2 = 21; and trial-to-trial 
variability of RMSjerk, F(2.90, 40.56) = 3.97, p = .02, η2 = 
.22. Pair-wise comparisons (Bonferroni) revealed generally 
lower mean and peak values and greater trial-to-trial vari-
ability during the high-complexity test than during the low-
complexity test or during the first and second transfer tests, 
or both. However, trial-to-trial variability was also generally 
higher during the first transfer test, possibly because of the 
initial novelty of that block (see Table 1).
Declarative Knowledge Protocol 
We contrasted the amount of explicit knowledge relevant 
to the mechanics of the movements in the two treatment 
conditions by using an independent-samples t test. The test 
revealed a significant difference between the two groups, 
t(33) = –2.68, p < .05, d = –.91. Participants reported more 
knowledge in the explicit condition (M = 4.67, SD = 2.10) 
than in the analogy condition (M = 3.18, SD = 1.04).
Discussion
Poolton et al. (2006) showed that in a time-constrained 
environment, performance costs associated with processing 
both a difficult decision and an immediate motor response 
can be reduced if the participant acquires the motor task 
implicitly, that is, by analogy learning. During the decision-
making test phase, adaptations made by participants because 
of the requirement to hit to targets left or right of center rather 
than centrally, as in the learning phase, may have confounded 
the findings. To overcome that problem, in this experiment 
we introduced a transfer test both before and after low- and 
high-complexity decision-making tests to ascertain whether 
adaptation continued throughout the test phase. In addition, 
we performed kinematic analysis of movements.
Participants learned to hit topspin forehand shots implic-
itly from our presentation of a single analogical instruction 
or explicitly from six step-by-step instructions that we 
provided. Consistent with previous findings in the explicit– 
implicit motor learning literature (Law, Masters, Bray, Eves, 
& Bardswell, 2003; Liao & Masters, 2001; Poolton et al., 
2006), analogy learning resulted in less movement-related 
knowledge than did explicit learning, suggesting that a 
smaller amount of movement information was accessible to 
working memory for online control of movement.
Participants made fewer correct decisions in response 
to the high-complexity test than in response to the low-
complexity test. The relative simplicity of low-complexity 
decisions meant that motor performance was not disrupted 
in either learning condition. No between-condition differ-
ences were evident when a complex decision was required. 
However participants’ performance was disrupted in the 
explicit condition but not in the analogy condition. That 
finding replicates the results of Poolton et al. (2006) and 
implies that implicit motor learning via analogy facilitates 
the processing of multiple streams of information in a man-
ner that is associated more with experts’ performance than 
with novices’ performance.
Analysis of the kinematic parameters showed that the 
movement characteristics remained constant in both condi-
tions during the low-complexity decision task but that mean 
and peak movement speed decreased and trial-to-trial vari-
ability increased during the high-complexity decision task 
in the explicit condition but not in the analogy condition. 
For the explicit learners, the demands associated with the 
task may have caused stiffening of the movements. The rea-
son for their movement stiffening is unclear, although peo-
ple commonly become anxious if they perceive themselves 
to be unable to meet the demands of a task (e.g., Cherry, 
1978; McGrath, 1970), and investigators have shown that 
anxiety increases motor stiffness (van Loon, Masters, Ring, 
& McIntyre, 2001). 
Masters and Liao (2003) proposed that analogies act as 
biomechanical metaphors that encapsulate (or chunk) many 
of the step-by-step rules of explicit performance. It is interest-
ing that participants who learned by analogy in the current 
study produced movements with higher peak acceleration, 
mean acceleration, peak jerk, mean jerk, and trial-to-trial vari-
ability than did those who learned from explicit, step-by-step 
instructions. That finding may reflect a learning paradigm that 
quickly results in characteristics of expert performance. For 
example, Bootsma and van Wieringen (1990) reported that 
expert players compensate for later shot initiation by increas-
ing the force (acceleration) applied in the shot. The greater 
acceleration (e.g., faster swing) evident in the analogy condi-
tion implies that analogy learners may have initiated move-
ments later in an effort to give themselves more time to pro-
cess the high-complexity decision before initiating the motor 
response. Direct comparison of the movement kinematics in 
each condition with those of expert performers would indicate 
how closely the movements reflected those of an expert.
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Although our findings support the working-memory 
explanation (Masters & Maxwell, 2004) for why implicit 
motor learning allows more efficient decision making and 
motor performance in time-constrained environments, an 
alternative explanation is that the modular architecture of 
working memory (Baddeley, 2003) allows parallel per-
formance of the tasks without taxing the same modules. 
Whereas cognitively demanding decisions (Jameson et al., 
2004) and manipulation of explicit information (MacMahon 
& Masters, 2002) occur in the central executive module of 
working memory, analogical instruction does not. Despite 
the verbal manner in which the analogy is communicated, 
TABLE 1. Means and Standard Deviations of All Kinematic Variables During the Test Phase
 Transfer 1 Low Complexity High Complexity Transfer 2
Kinematic variable M SD M SD M SD M SD
Analogy learning
Mean movement speed 2.57 0.69 2.57 0.74 2.45 0.63 2.54 0.65
Root mean square  
 acceleration (RMSacc) 40.46  11.27 43.82 18.96 40.66 11.53 37.65 11.40
Root mean square jerk  
 (RMSjerk) 1,274.16 355.45 1,328.14 450.69 1,316.21 344.00 1,172.12 346.41
Peak movement speed 6.49 1.56 6.49 1.57 6.16 1.58 6.41 1.69
Peak RMSacc 91.64 24.88 107.82 77.81 92.22  24.90 88.44 28.04
Peak RMSjerk 3,851.64 1,000.59 3,904.82 1,295.77 3,794.70 892.49 3,565.32 1,161.18
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of mean movement speed 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.35 0.13 0.41 0.17
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of RMSacc 6.57 2.43 7.19 6.30 7.26 2.99 6.79 2.89
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of RMSjerk 294.70  97.71 354.91 395.05 329.34 126.15 288.48 111.18
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of peak movement speed 0.66 0.26 0.72 0.48 0.72 0.31 0.71 0.27
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of peak RMSacc 20.72 7.76 25.53 35.01 20.81 9.48 19.58 8.30
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of peak RMSjerk 1,244.42 441.75 1,539.76 1,882.26 1,229.70 533.36 1,149.69 512.91
Explicit learning
Mean movement speed 2.41 0.56a 2.22 0.48a,b 2.16 0.44b 2.36 0.51a
Root mean square  
 acceleration (RMSacc) 32.98 10.68a 30.52 8.43a 30.08 7.76a 30.15 6.90a
Root mean square jerk  
 (RMSjerk) 1,016.36 330.30a 903.70 226.88a 923.32 278.77a 931.31 179.08a
Peak movement speed 6.21 1.04a 5.99 1.08a 5.51 0.79b 6.00 0.92a
Peak RMSacc 74.43 19.86a 70.67 19.50a 68.61 13.85a 70.90 15.05a
Peak RMSjerk 3,060.31 770.36a 2,859.05 648.49a 2,799.31 557.88a 2,921.74 555.79a
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of mean movement speed 0.36 0.14a 0.28 0.09a 0.33 0.12a 0.26 0.09a
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of RMSacc 5.64 2.83a,b 3.94 1.51a 5.32 1.79b 4.62 1.06a,b
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of RMSjerk 225.21 99.57a,b 166.46 62.70a 238.77 101.55b 212.12 70.56a,b
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of peak movement speed 0.57 0.36a 0.47 0.14a 0.79 0.64a 0.53 0.20a
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of peak RMSacc 15.53 6.58a 12.47 3.94a 18.52 11.05a 15.99 5.40a
Trial-to-trial variability  
 of peak RMSjerk 887.42 344.58a 818.01 371.35a 1108.23 539.53a 872.47 308.72a
Note. There were no significant differences between blocks for any measure at p < .05. Low- and high-complexity decision tests were inter-
spersed between two transfer tests (T1 and T2). Distances are expressed in meters; times are expressed in seconds. Shared superscripts (a,b) 
denote no significant differences at p < .05.
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Liao and Masters (2001) argued that the analogy is likely 
to be processed as an image in the visuospatial sketchpad 
module of working memory, where it can be used to support 
movement control. Consequently, the neuromotor system 
may process the two tasks in different modules within 
working memory without overreaching the capacity of the 
working-memory area to process them simultaneously.
Another possibility is that analogy learners more eas-
ily switched between the two tasks than explicit learners 
did. Poolton et al. (2006) dismissed that possibility on the 
ground that the time window for task execution was unlike-
ly to be sufficient to accommodate task-switching behavior. 
The temporal constraints of the task in this study also sug-
gest that task switching was not feasible. Researchers have 
found that durations between shot initiation and bat–ball 
contact of 370 ms increase to approximately 399 ms when 
participants have to adapt the parameters of the movement 
to hit the ball to either the left or the right side of the table 
(e.g., Roth, 1989). We approximated that participants had a 
450-ms time window between ball release and ball strike in 
which they could execute the movement. Given that simple 
reaction times approximate 190 ms and escalate as the 
number of stimulus–response choices increase (Hick, 1952; 
Welford, 1980), an overlap between the two components of 
the task was probable, and task switching is unlikely to have 
been an effective strategy.
Our findings suggest that although analogical instruc-
tions are conveyed explicitly, they are cognitively efficient 
(as defined by Moors & De Houwer, 2006), in that they 
demand few processing resources (Law et al., 2003; Liao 
& Masters, 2001; Masters & Liao, 2003; Poolton et al., 
2006). As a consequence, learning by analogy appears to 
install in the motor behavior of novices (implicit) charac-
teristics that normally are not evident in perception–action 
behavior until the performer is much farther along the road 
to expertise. 
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APPENDIX
Instructions to Participants in the Explicit Learning 
Condition and the Analogy Learning Condition
Explicit learninga
1. Keep your feet a little wider than shoulder width apart.
2. Position your feet behind the table with the right foot  
 farthest from the table.
3. Move the bat backward and down.
4. Move your body weight to the front leg.
5. Move your playing arm forward and upward.
6. Keep the bat face at a vertical angle.
Analogy learning
 Move the bat as if it is traveling up the side of a mountain.
aWe took the instructions for the explicit learning condition from 
S. Sneyd (1994) and The Sport Council (1995). A Cantonese 
translation of the instructions is available from the authors.
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